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Abstract. The basics of full reserve banking (FR) are set out below, followed by forty 
defective criticisms of FR. Each of those forty sections has: 1. A heading. 2. Where the 
heading does not adequately capture the nature of the criticism, there is a paragraph below 
the heading starting “I.e…”, which expands on the heading. 3. There are references to one 
or more economists who have put the relevant criticism. 4. The answer to each criticism 
which starts with a paragraph beginning with the word “Answer.” And finally, this work is 
an updated version of Musgrave (2014). About 90% of the content of this and the latter 
work are the same. Abbreviations used are thus. CB refers to “Central bank” and PB refers 
to private bank. The term “commercial bank” would be more accurate than private bank 
since a commercial bank can perfectly well be publically owned. But the words central and 
commercial unfortunately both begin with “c”. Thus the term “private bank” is arguably 
better. The word bank on its own refers to a PB.  
Keywords. Full reserve banking, Fractional reserve banking. 
JEL. E58, G01, G21. 
 
1. Introduction: Full reserve banking in brief 
he term full reserve banking (FR) refers here to the system advocated by 
Friedman (1960, 2
nd
 half of Ch3), Kotlikoff (2012, p.43), Levitin (2015), 
and Werner, et al. (2011) amongst others. That system issometimes called 
“100% reserve banking” and is as follows.  
The existing banking industry is split in two. One half offers depositors totally 
safe accounts (or accounts which are as near total safety as it is possible to get). In 
order to ensure that the money really is completely safe, nothing is done with the 
money: it is just lodged at the central bank (CB). Though possibly (as advocated by 
Friedman) some of that money could be invested in short term government debt. 
That money thus earns little or no interest, but it is instant access, and is used by 
account holders for day to day transactions. 
The second half of the industry lends to mortgagors, industry and so on. But 
that half of the industry is funded just by shareholders, or stakeholders who are in 
effect shareholders. For example under Kotlikoff‟s system, both halves of the 
industry consist of mutual funds (“unit trusts” in the UK), with the first half 
consisting of money market mutual funds and the second half consisting of non-
money market mutual funds. And those with a stake in non-money market mutual 
funds (as is the case with existing non-money market mutual funds) are in effect 
shareholders, thought they are not normally referred to as such. 
As to Friedman‟s system, there again, the entities making up one half of the 
former banking industry are separate from the entities making up the second half. 
In contrast, under Werner et al‟s system, safe accounts and accounts which lend on 
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account holders‟ money are offered under the same roof. However, the basic 
principle of all three systems is the same. 
One advantage of FR is that no bank or bank like entity can suddenly fail in the 
same way as banks tend to suddenly fail under the existing system. Thus no 
taxpayer backing or subsidies are needed to underpin the system. However, any 
entity can decline slowly given poor management. The reasons why sudden failure 
is ruled out are as follows. 
As to safe entities / accounts, the money there is near completely safe. And as to 
lending entities, if lending is done in an incompetent manner, all that happens is 
that the value of the relevant shares (or mutual fund units) falls: the actual entity 
does not become insolvent. 
As Selgin (1988) put it “For a balance sheet without debt liabilities, insolvency 
is ruled out…” – which is not to suggest Selgin supports FR. 
Incidentally, and returning to the above mentioned mutual funds, a particular 
type of bank / mutual fund in the US is being forced to obey the rules of FR, 
namely existing money market mutual funds. E.g. see SEC (2014). 
Another important merit in FR is that it disposes of the seignorage profits which 
private banks (PBs) make. Those profits are effectively a subsidy of PBs in much 
the same way as a traditional backstreet counterfeiter is subsidised by the 
community at large. As the economics Nobel laureate Maurice Allais put it: 
“In reality, the „miracles‟ performed by credit are fundamentally 
comparable to the „miracles‟ an association of counterfeiters could perform 
for its benefit by lending its forged banknotes in return for interest. In both 
cases, the stimulus to the economy would be the same, and the only 
difference is who benefits." 
However, the question as to whether PBs really do enjoy seignorage profits is 
not simple, and is examined in more detail in section 39 below. 
 
2. Criticisms of FR 
2.1. FR limits the availability of credit. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.21), Vickers (2011, para 3.21.) and Kregel 
(2012). See Kregel‟s passage starting, “In a narrow banking system..”. 
Answer. FR certainly limits the availability of credit in that it requires those 
who fund loans and investments to carry the risk involved (as opposed to the 
existing system where the taxpayer carries the ultimate risk). And that means the 
cost of funding loans and investments will rise a bit. But that rise in the cost of 
borrowing simply reflects the removal of a subsidy: that‟s the current practice of 
letting people have their money loaned on or invested, with the taxpayer carrying 
the ultimate risk.  
As to the deflationary or demand reducing effect of that reduced availability of 
credit, that is easily dealt with by standard stimulatory measures (the measure 
favoured by advocates of FR, at least Friedman (1960) and Werner et al. (2011)) 
being to simply create new base money and spend it into the economy and/or cut  
taxes). 
As implied above, taxpayers do not carry all the risk involved in lending. For 
example in the US there is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
which charges banks an insurance premium and reimburses depositors when a bank 
fails. However, the FDIC only deals with relatively small banks. Thus it‟s 
taxpayers who carry the risk when it comes to large banks. Plus even in the case of 
small banks, there is only one way of providing depositors with complete and total 
safety, and that‟s to have the full power of the state involved (backed by taxpayers 
of course). After all, any insurer (e.g. the FDIC) can face the situation where it just 
cannot meet all claims if enough large losses occur at once. 
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2. 2. Safe account money is not invested under FR: a waste. 
I.e. as regards the safe accounts or safe entities that are set up under FR, that 
involves storing significant amounts of money which on the face of it could be 
used for loans and investments, and that is a waste. 
Claimed by Vickers (2011, section 3.21). 
Answer. When FR is implemented and $Xbn is lodged in safe accounts (which 
comes the same thing as people storing $Xbn under their mattresses), it costs 
nothing to supply the population with the sums that it wants to keep under those 
hypothetical mattresses. As Friedman (1960, Ch3) put it, “It need cost society 
essentially nothing in real resources to provide the individual with the current 
services of an additional dollar in cash balances.” 
That argument can be put the other way round and as follows. Assume FR has 
been implemented, and to keep things simple, assume the economy is at capacity. 
And assume that the above money in safe accounts is then used to fund loans. That 
amounts to, or causes an increase in aggregate demand, and that‟s not possible, 
assuming the economy is already at capacity. Thus to counteract that increase in 
demand, interest rates would have to rise. Thus the net effect would be no increase 
in lending. Thus the above claim by Vickers that unused money in safe accounts is 
money that can be actually used does not stand inspection. 
2. 3. Central bank money is not debt free. 
I.e. the claim by some advocates of FR that CB money is “debt free” is false 
because all money is a form of debt.  
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.21) and Wray (2015). 
Answer. In a not very important sense the above “all money is debt” idea is 
right: that is, base money or CB created money is NOMINALLY a debt owed by 
the CB to the holder of that money. Indeed British £10 notes and other notes 
actually state “I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of £10”. 
But of course that “promise” is a farce. That is, anyone trying to get £10 of gold 
(or anything else) from the Bank of England in exchange for their £10 notes, would 
be told to go away (perhaps assisted by the police). Thus in effect, CB created 
money is indeed debt free. 
In contrast, for every dollar of money created by commercial banks there is, or 
so it seems, a dollar of debt (owed by a borrower to a commercial bank). But even 
that argument is debatable (See No.39 below). 
It could be argued that base money is a debt in the following sense. A 
characteristic of a debt is that it can be used to nullify and equal and opposite debt. 
Thus when government suddenly demands $X of tax from you, you can use base 
money to pay them (in fact it‟s the only money they will accept in many countries). 
Thus it could be argued that base money BECOMES a debt when you receive a tax 
demand. But that is not the normal meaning of the word “debt”. 
So the conclusion is that when it comes to the amount of debt associated with 
privately issued money as compared to publically issued money, there are 
important differences. The claim that publically issued money (base money) is 
debt-free may not be totally accurate, but it is not far from the truth. (For some 
slightly different arguments against Wray‟s “all money is debt” argument, see 
Lonergan (2016)) 
2.4. Bank capital is expensive for tax reasons. 
I.e. increasing bank capital as occurs when FR is implemented would involve a 
cost in that the tax treatment of equity is more onerous that in the case of deposits.  
Claimed by Elliot (2013). 
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Answer. The above argument contains an extremely simple flaw, namely that 
tax is an entirely artificial imposition, and should thus be ignored. To illustrate, if 
government taxed red cars more heavily that blue cars, that would raise the price of 
red cars. But that would not be evidence that the REAL COST of producing red 
cars was any more than the cost of blue cars.  
2. 5. Central banks will still have to lend to commercial banks. 
I.e. to deal with any lack of availability of credit, the CB may need to lend to 
private banks (PBs) which exposes the CB to risks.Thus FR does not dispose of 
risks for taxpayers. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013). See paragraph starting “Fourth, we 
consider…” (p.34). 
Answer. Some FR advocates claim that CBs may indeedneed to lend to PBs, but 
most of them argue that new CB money should only be spent into the economy 
when there is room for stimulus. As to lending, most FR advocates believe in 
leaving that and interest rates to the free market. That is, if demand for credit 
exceeds supply, most FR advocates believe in simply letting the price of credit rise. 
Moreover the logic used by the authorities in the recent crisis to justify 
assistance to banks is very debatable: that logic being that banks have made large 
losses, therefor they should be supplied with enough taxpayers‟ money to enable 
them to return to the amount of lending that existed prior to the crisis. 
In any normal industry, the fact that losses are made is a good indication that the 
industry is too large and needs to contract. And as to the fact that if the total 
amount of lending declines if the banking industry declines which in turn reduces 
aggregate demand, that is easily dealt with by standard stimulatory measures. 
Indeed, according to the former governor of the Bank of England (King, 2010) 
the assets of banks in Britain are now ten times what they were relative to GDP in 
the 1960s: additional evidence that the banking industry should be shrunk. 
Of course, assuming we continue with the existing banking system, giving 
banks enough assistance during a crisis to prevent a total collapse of an economy 
or the world economy is justified. But the recent trillion dollar bailout of banks is 
just additional evidence of the flaws in the existing system: it‟s not an argument for 
CBs to lend to commercial banks on a regular basis. 
Moreover, the lender of last resort facility available to commercial banks is just 
one of forms of preferential treatment (i.e. subsidy) enjoyed by commercial banks: 
other industries do not enjoy the same luxury. 
2. 6.  FR stops banks producing free money from thin air which can fund 
investments. 
I.e. when a private bank grants a loan, it can be argued that the relevant money 
comes out of thin air and that money can be used to fund investments. Thus (so it 
might seem) people do not really need to save in order to fund investments. 
Claimed by Pettifor (2014) and Kregel (2012).  See Kregel‟s passage where he 
claims that FR would create a system “in which all investment decisions….” See 
Pettifor‟s paragraph starting “Unlike commodity money…”. 
Answer. The idea that we don‟t need to save in order to provide ourselves with 
investments (houses, office blocks, etc) is too good to be true. And as the old 
saying goes, if anything seems to be too good to be true, it probably is. 
If an economy is at capacity and a bank grants a loan, the latter will raise 
demand unless someone abstains from spending (i.e. saves). And if the economy is 
at capacity and demand rises, then inflation rises. As a result the central bank will 
raise interest rates, which cuts lending, borrowing and demand. Thus the net effect 
is zero: back to square one. Thus the idea that commercial banks can create money 
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or wealth out of thin air which enables someone to make real investments is a 
myth. 
The latter “zero effect” obviously plays out slightly differently depending on 
exactly how the authorities counteract the above increase in demand (e.g. they 
could counteract it with a fiscal tightening up). Plus the zero effect would play out 
differently depending on whether the country was on the gold standard or not. But 
certainly the idea that we can enjoy the benefits of new investments without having 
to save or abstain from consumption to fund those investments is nonsense. 
In contrast to the above assumption that the economy is at capacity, the 
alternative and equally valid assumption is that it is not at capacity. In that case 
there is indeed a free lunch to be had. That is, as suggested by Pettifor and Kregel, 
private banks can produce money from nowhere which can fund investments, and 
there is no need to cut down on current consumption to pay for that investment. 
What happens is that unemployed resources (e.g. unemployed labour) is put to 
work to create those investments.  
However, there are two problems with that argument. First, private banks act in 
a pro-cyclical fashion: that is in a recession, far from lending out more money to 
fund investments, they do the opposite, namely cut down on lending. And come a 
boom, they create and lend out money like there is no tomorrow, thus exacerbating 
the boom: exactly what we do not want. Thus the implication made by Kregel and 
Pettifor namely that PBs help us out of recessions is very questionable. 
Second, the fact that private banks in practice do not give us the free lunch 
alluded to by Kregel and Pettifor does not matter at all because the state or central 
bank can provide the free lunch. That is, the state can implement stimulus in some 
form or other. Indeed, there is no particular reason to assume, given a recession, 
that the cause is inadequate investment: that is, does it not make more sense to 
implement general stimulus, as a result of which businesses where they see fit will 
doubtless invest more? 
2.7. Investments under FR might not be viable. 
Claimed by Kregel (2012). See his passage starting “First, the real investments 
chosen….” 
Answer. The advocates of FR do not claim that investors will be any more 
competent under FR than under the existing system. Clearly under both systems 
there are, or will be competent and incompetent investors. 
2.8. FR will not reduce pleas by failing industries to be rescued by 
government. 
Claimed by Kregel (2012). See his passage starting “There would always be a 
risk…” 
Answer. Advocates of FR do not claim that FR is a solution to corruption: in 
particular, politically well-connected individuals trying to extract taxpayers‟ money 
from politicians. 
2.9. The cost of converting to FR will be high. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.21 and by Warner (2014). 
Answer. Assuming a country benefits from FR and continues to benefit for the 
next century or two, then transition costs are near irrelevant compared to the long 
term benefits. Moreover, as one advocate of FR (Friedman, 1960, Ch.3) put it 
“There is no technical problem of achieving a transition from our present system to 
100% reserves easily, fairly speedily, and without serious repercussions on 
financial or economic markets”. 
2.10. Central bank committees won’t be politically neutral. 
I.e. FR involves some committee of economists (and perhaps non-economists) 
deciding on how much money to create and spend, or deciding on other forms of 
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stimulus, and there is no guarantee such a committee will be independent or 
politically neutral. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.22) and by Pettifor (2014). See Pettifor‟s 
paragraph starting “Wolf‟s proposal is problematic….”. 
Answer. There is no reason why this should be any more or less of a problem 
than with existing committees that determine stimulus. For example there is the 
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee which has a huge influence on 
stimulus (via interest rate adjustments, quantitative easing, etc). Other countries 
obviously have similar committees. And those committees are certainly not 
supposed to stray into political territory. But the dividing line between the political 
and the strictly economic will never be totally clear. However (and to repeat) that 
would be no more of a problem under FR than under the existing system. 
Moreover, Dyson & Jackson (2013) (and doubtless other advocates of FR) are 
very specific on the point that the above sort of committee should never interfere 
with political decisions. The exact way this is done under Dyson‟s system is for the 
“committee” to decide how much money should be spent net of changes tax into 
the economy over the next six months (or some other period), while the exact way 
that money is spend (or whether the adjustment to net spending comes in the form 
of adjustments to tax) is left entirely to politicians and voters. 
Also, the form of stimulus advocated by most supporters of FR (i.e. creating 
new base money and spending it and/or cutting taxes) comes to exactly the same 
thing as a form of stimulus that has been applied in very large doses over the last 
two or three years: that is fiscal stimulus followed by quantitative easing. Thus if 
political interference by the above sort of committee is inevitable under FR, one 
has to wonder how those sort of committees have managed to avoid interfering in 
politics to any significant extent over the last few years. 
2.11. Administration costs of FR would be high. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2014) and Krugman (2014). See Krugman‟s 
paragraph starting “Cochrane‟s proposal calls for…”. 
Answer. Obviously the central bank or some other body of bank regulators 
would have to do a fair amount of auditing of commercial banks to make sure they 
were obeying the rules. But such auditing is necessary under the existing system. 
Moreover, compare that with the rules which make up the Dodd-Frank regulations: 
those stand at 20,000 pages and counting (several times the length of “War and 
Peace”). And then there is the near incoherent ring-fence proposals put by Vickers 
(2011). Compared to those two, FR is simplicity itself. 
For a scathing indictment of Vickers, see Kotlikoff (2012). As to Dodd-Frank, 
the head of the Dallas Fed (Fisher, 2013) said “We contend that Dodd–Frank has 
not done enough to corral “too big to fail banks” and that, on balance, the act has 
made things worse, not better.” And for two more criticisms of current attempts at 
bank reform see Schiller (2014) and Brown (2013). 
2.12. The cost of current accounts will rise under FR. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.22) and Aziz (2014).  
Answer. It is true that under FR, those with transaction / safe / current / 
checking accounts get little or no interest: i.e. probably less interest than on such 
accounts under the existing system. However interest under the existing system 
only comes as a result of being able to have one‟s money loaned on or invested 
with the taxpayer carrying the ultimate risk. But the latter is a totally unwarranted 
“have your cake and eat it” subsidy. 
If restaurants had been subsidised for the last century and that subsidy was 
removed, then (to use Van Dixhoorn‟s phrase) “losses would be imposed on” those 
eating at restaurants. But that would not justify continuing to subsidise restaurants. 
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A possible solution to the above problem would be to allow bank customers to 
do debit card transactions or draw cheques on investment accounts (that‟s accounts 
which fund loans to mortgagors, businesses, etc). That would be the equivalent of 
telling your bank under the existing system keep the balance in your current or 
checking account to a minimum: i.e. telling them to put any surplus funds into a 
term or deposit account. However banks would charge for that service, thus costs 
for customers would probably not be reduced: probably one of the reasons why that 
sort of service is not normally available from banks under the existing system. 
2.13. FR is dependent on demand injections. 
Claimed by Kregel (2012) and Fontana & Sawyer (2016, section 3). 
Answer. One wonders how Kregel (2012) and Fontana & Sawyer (2016) would 
describe the trillion dollars recently used to bail out the bank industry and the large 
amounts of stimulus needed to rectify the effects of the recent crisis. Kregel uses 
the phrase “chronically dependent on demand injections”. The phrase “chronically 
dependent” would seem more appropriate to the existing banking system, rather 
than to FR. 
Moreover, stimulus costs nothing in real terms: to put it figuratively, printing 
and spending dollar bills (and/or cutting taxes) costs nothing. (See the quote from 
Friedman in No.2 above). 
2.14. The effect of FR on inflation and unemployment is unclear. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013). As Van Dixhoorn put it: “it would be 
difficult to predict what the ultimate effects on output and inflation would be..”. 
Answer. There is no need whatever to predict what the effect on output or 
inflation would be because the latter two can be adjusted (just as they are under the 
existing system) by adjusting stimulus. That of course is done under the existing 
system by adjusting interest rates, quantitative easing, the size of the deficit, etc. In 
contrast, most advocates of FR advocate a slightly different form of stimulus 
(which actually amounts to fiscal stimulus plus QE). But that‟s a minor technical 
point. 
Moreover, under the existing system, governments have only the haziest ideas as 
to what inflation and unemployment will be five years from now: e.g. there might 
be another credit crunch, or there might not. Thus the above criticism applies to the 
existing system as much as it does to FR. 
2.15. The state cannot be trusted with peoples’ money. 
I.e. the so called “safe accounts” set up under FR are not entirely safe. 
Claimed by (Van Dixhoorn, 2013) section VIII, p.32. 
Answer. Clearly governments are not entirely reliable and for two reasons. First, 
governments may cause excess inflation, which means that sums deposited in safe 
accounts lose their value, and second, governments have been known to renege on 
promises to return sums they have borrowed or which have been lodged with them. 
However, neither of those two points stands inspection. 
As to inflation, if money lodged at the central bank is losing its value, then 
money lodged at a private bank will lose value at exactly the same rate. 
And as to the point that governments can renege on promises to return monies 
lodged with them, the sort of government which does that is quite likely to also 
confiscate monies lodged at private banks (sometimes known in polite circles as 
“bailing in depositors”). 
Moreover, FR is a system suitable for a country with a reasonably responsible 
government. Obviously where government is near non-existent or chaotic, citizens 
would be well advised to keep their savings under their mattress and/or in the form 
of valuables like some rare metal. 
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And finally, under the existing system, millions of UK citizens seem to be 
happy to lodge a portion of their money with National Savings and Investments, a 
state run savings bank. That is, the reality is that a significant proportion of the 
population in Britain regard government as being responsible enough to be 
entrusted with a portion of their wealth. 
2.16. FR will reduce innovation by banks. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013). Van Dixhoorn‟s actual words are: “will 
reduce the amount of innovation in the payments system”. 
Answer.Under FR, banks compete with each other exactly as they do under the 
existing system. Thus why there is less incentive to innovate is a mystery. Van 
Dixhoorn does not explain. 
Also the above claim about lack of innovation is hard to square with the fact 
that at least two advocates of FR (Dyson, 2016 and Niepelt, 2016) strongly support 
what is probably the biggest “innovation in the payments system” for a hundred 
years, namely a system where anyone can have an account at the central bank with 
such accounts being run on block-chain technology. 
The reason for that support is that the latter type of accounts and payments 
system comes to the same thing as the safe accounts advocated by FR enthusiasts. 
Thus if those central bank accounts came to dominate the system, then FR would 
have been partially implemented. 
Incidentally, Niepelt is not an ardent supporter of FR in the same way as Dyson 
is. But Niepeltdoes say the above CB block-chain system would ease the 
introduction of FR. 
2.17.  Lenders will try to turn their liabilities into “near-monies”. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013) p.33. 
Answer. Obviously some lenders will try to do that. In fact advocates of FR in 
the 1930s were well aware of that potential problem as are present day advocates of 
FR, Dyson & Jackson (2013) in particular. However there is a fundamental reason 
for thinking that while obviously a finite amount of near money creation will 
always take place, the actual amount of that money creation will never be 
significant. The reason for that stems from the text book definition of the word 
money, which is something like “anything widely accepted in payment for goods 
and services or in settlement of a debt”. The crucial phrase there is “widely 
accepted”. 
Large banks or “money creators” (e.g. Barclays or Chase) are widely 
recognised, thus their liabilities are widely accepted. But it is impossible for those 
large organisations to escape the attention of the authorities. To illustrate if 
Barclays said in its promotional literature something like “We offer you the 
combined advantages of instant access to your money, plus we guarantee you‟ll get 
£X back from us for every £X you deposit, plus you get a decent rate of interest 
because we will lend out your money”, auditors and/or the authorities would have 
to be stupid not to notice that. 
In contrast, there will doubtless always be small shadow banks which manage to 
issue liabilities that are used as money, but those sort of organisations are not 
widely recognised. Thus their liabilities are not (to quote the above definition of 
money) “widely accepted”. Thus even if they do manage to issue near monies, 
those liabilities would not be very “money like”. 
2.18. Are debts owed by one non-bank firm to another a form of money? 
Van Dixhoorn (2013) - claims they are. See paragraph starting “The sector 
will…” p.34). 
Answer. The definition of the word money is something like “anything widely 
accepted in payment for goods and services”. 
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Now the liabilities of banks are “widely accepted” because they are specifically 
designed to be easily transferrable. In contrast, it is quite untrue to suggest, as Van 
Dixhoorn does that an ordinary trade credit is a form of money. To illustrate, if 
firm A delivers goods to firm B worth $X, B is then indebted to A to the tune of 
$X. And B could issue an IOU in payment. But is that liability (the IOU) likely to 
be of any use to A for the purposes of “paying money” to some third party? It is 
unlikely. Thus an ordinary trade credit just isn't money in a large majority of cases. 
The latter form of “IOU” money creation was much more common in the 1700s 
and 1800s: the IOUs took the form of bills of exchange. But those are rare 
nowadays. 
But that is not to say that after implementing FR there would be a total absence 
of types of money other than what the average household or firm regards as money. 
In particular, in the world‟s financial centres various types of debt serve the 
purpose of money: e.g. short term government debt. However for about 95% of 
households and the large majority of firms, particularly small and medium size 
ones, there is only one form of money and that is CB created money and money 
created by well known PB swhich trades at par with CB money. 
2.19. Advocates of FR are concerned just with retail banking. 
Claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, paragraph starting “Third the critics have..” 
p.34 and Krugman (2014).  
Answer. While VanDixhoorn claims the advocates of FR concentrate on the 
“small saver”, she cites no evidence to support the claim. Nor does Krugman. 
Having read a large amount about FR, my impression is that the advocates of 
FR are concerned with general principles. One of the main principles is that banks 
should not promise to return $X to depositors for every $X deposited when that 
money is loaned on in a less than entirely safe manner. Whether the depositors are 
large corporations with several million deposited, or pensioners who have 
deposited much smaller amounts is wholly irrelevant. 
2.20. The government and/or central bank will not be better than the 
market at regulating the amount of money. 
Claimed by Warner (2014) passage starting “..it takes quite a leap to think..”. 
Answer. We have just been thru a crisis caused by a catastrophic failure of 
private banks to regulate the amount of money / loans in a stable manner. Thus the 
above alleged weakness in FR flies in the face of reality. 
Moreover, most of those who make the above criticism seem quite happy for 
government and CB to regulate aggregate demand (e.g. by regulating interest 
rates). And that regulation is necessary precisely because the free market produces 
booms and busts.  
Of course governments‟ and CBs‟ efforts to tone down booms and busts are 
nowhere near 100% competent. But, the people who make the above criticism 
clearly think that the latter efforts are better than nothing. 
An even more glaring self-contradiction inherent to the above criticism is that 
the form of stimulus effected over the last two or three years (fiscal stimulus 
followed by QE) comes to exactly the same thing as the form of stimulus advocated 
by most FR advocates. 
2.21. FR would drive business to unregulated sector. 
Claimed by Krugman (2014) passage starting “If we impose 100% reserve..” 
and by Diamond & Dybvig (1986). 
Answer. Clearly if government regulates just one part of an industry, that will 
cause a number of operators to flee to the unregulated sector. And that has indeed 
happened over the last decade. That is, there has been a shift of business away from 
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official banks and into the shadow bank sector. But the simple solution to that is to 
regulate any entity above a certain size that amounts to a bank. 
As the former head of the UK‟s Financial Services Authority, Turner (2012) put 
it: "If it looks like a bank and quacks like a bank, it has got to be subject to bank-
like safe-guards." 
As for the fact that the unregulated sector contains numerous small entities 
which the authorities might not be able to keep tabs on, that point was dealt with 
above. Briefly, the smaller an entity, the less widely accepted will its liabilities be, 
thus the less money like will those liabilities be. 
Also most FR advocates do not advocate a complete ban on forms of money 
other than state issued money: most FR advocates favour local currencies 
(currencies issued by individual cities and similar small geographical areas). 
2.22. It wasn’t just banks that went wrong in 2008: also households 
became over-indebted. 
Claimed by Krugman (2014). 
Answer. So who were those households indebted to? It was banks (or those who 
banks had sold mortgage backed securities to). It was banks who sold those “No 
Income No Job or Assets” mortgages. 
Under FR, if a lending institution makes silly loans, all that happens is that the 
shareholders or stakeholders in the entity find the value of their stakes decline. The 
entity does not go insolvent. 
2.23. Creation of liquidity / money is prevented. 
Claimed by Diamond & Dybvig (1986). 
Answer. True, but that is the whole object of the exercise. That is, advocates of 
FR claim that just the CB should create money, while commercial banks continue 
to act as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders much as they do now (with 
the exception that lenders carry all losses when poor loans are made rather than the 
taxpayer carrying some of those losses as occurs at present). 
Put another way, CBs can and do create money / liquidity just as much as PBs. 
Thus the important question is: should we have just the CB doing it, or CBs plus 
PBs or just PBs? Given that we already give CBs doing the job of countering the 
instabilities created by the free market (including PB money creation), why not just 
go the whole way and have just CBs doing the job? 
Having both type of bank do the job is similar to allowing your child access to 
the steering wheel of a car: you can no doubt counteract any silly moves the child 
makes (the equivalent of CBs countering the “silly moves” of PBs), but it‟s simpler 
just to bar children / PBs any access to the controls. 
2. 24. Funding via commercial paper would be more difficult under FR.  
Claimed by Diamond & Dybvig (1986). 
Answer. Funding via commercial paper would certainly become more difficult 
of the rules applied under FR were extended from banks to non-bank corporations. 
But there is not much reason to do so. 
It is true that borrowing specific sums of money (which is what is involved in 
commercial paper) is a more risky method of funding a corporation that funding 
via shares. But mass collapses of non-bank corporations just do not seem to have 
been a problem over the last two centuries in contrast to catastrophic collapses (but 
for the intervention of governments) of banking systems. 
Also, liabilities issued by non-bank corporations are not by any stretch of the 
imagination a form of money, and it is money printing by PBs which is one of the 
root flaws in the existing bank system. 
2. 25. FR is nearly the same as monetarism. 
Claimed by Pettifor (2014), and Fontana (2016, section 2.2). 
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Answer. It is true that advocates of FR (just like the advocates of Modern 
Monetary Theory) claim that the size of the stock of base money (or more 
generally “Private sector net financial assets” to use MMT parlance) influences 
demand. To that extent, both groups have something in common with monetarists. 
However, advocates of FR (like the majority of economists probably) also claim 
that the process of spending extra money into the economy also has an effect. I.e. 
they claim fiscal boost has an effect. That is, if government decides to hire an extra 
thousand employees by this time next month and pay for that with new money, 
then employment goes up by a thousand, all else equal (assuming the extra money 
is not inflationary, i.e. assuming the economy was below capacity before the extra 
thousand were hired). And that all happens despite there being no “monetary” 
effect (at least initially). That is, during the first few months of the above thousand 
employees work, there is a negligible increase in the money supply. 
2.26. Deposit insurance and lender of last resort solves existing banking 
problems. 
I.e. there is no need for FR. 
Claimed by Aziz (2014). 
Answer. Lender of last resort (a luxury not available to other industries) is a 
subsidy of the bank industry, particularly where the loans made by CBs to PBs are 
at a zero or near zero rate, as occurred at the height of the recent crisis. That‟s in 
contrast to the penalty rate advocated by Walter Bagehot.  
Same goes for deposit insurance where that is funded by taxpayers, as was the 
case in the UK till recently. 
As it explains in the introductory economics text books, subsidies misallocate 
resources, that is, they reduce GDP (unless there is a very good social justification 
for a subsidy.) 
Incidentally, and contrary to common perception, Walter Bagehot did not 
approve of lender of last resort (Bagehot, 1873: final chapter). He regarded it as 
something that was so ingrained in the system that it would be impossible to 
remove. 
It can of course be argued that the FDIC is a self-funding insurance system, and 
hence that there is no subsidy element there. Well the answer to that is that there is 
no such thing as a totally reliable private sector self-funding insurance corporation. 
Reason is that the latter type of insurers can and do go bust. In contrast, the near 
100% safety that comes from state owned insurance systems like FDIC derive from 
the fact that the taxpayer backs up the FDIC. And taxpayer backing equals a 
subsidy. 
2.27. There is no demand for safe or warehouse banks. 
I.e. there has been no demand for throughout history for banks which simply 
lodge money without lending it on and thus earning depositors some interest. Thus 
there would be no demand for the safe accounts under FR. 
Claimed by White (2003) and Van Dixhoorn (2013). 
Answer. First, the above contradicts the equally common claim by opponents of 
FR that there‟d be a stampede for safe accounts when FR is introduced. See No.28 
below. 
Second, there is good evidence as to what would happen that can be gleaned 
from what depositors at US money market mutual funds have done recently as a 
result of the rules of FR being imposed on MMMFs. It seems that a majority of 
depositors are opting for safe accounts rather than accounts where they bear the 
costs of poor loans and investments. 
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Third, accounts already exist in some countries (e.g. National Savings and 
Investment accounts in the UK) which are essentially the same as the safe accounts 
envisaged under FR. Billions have been deposited at the NSI. 
Fourth, to the extent that there is a limited demand for warehouse banking since 
WWII, that is hardly surprising. Reason is that taxpayer funded backing for 
conventional banks enables ordinary depositors to enjoy total safety while getting 
interest. Why go for an account that pays no interest when you can get interest 
gratis the taxpayer? 
2.28. FR would cause a stampede to safe accounts. 
I.e. few existing depositors would want their stake in their bank to be effectively 
converted to a shareholding. 
Claimed by Dowd (2014). 
Answer. The reality is that shareholders (in corporations in general rather than 
specifically in banks) do not demand a particularly high rate of return compared to 
depositors or bond-holders. 
Moreover, the above claim by Dowd contradicts the claim made by several 
opponents of FR, namely that there‟d be no demand for safe accounts - see No.27 
above. 
2.29. FR would raise the cost of funding banks. 
I.e. it might seem that the cost of funding banks rises because shareholders 
demand a bigger return on their investment than depositors. Thus if the proportion 
of bank funding that comes from shares as opposed to deposits is increased then the 
cost of funding banks would seem to rise. 
Answer. The flaw in the above argument was set out by Franco Modigliani and 
Merton Miller. As they pointed out, the risks involved in running a bank which 
performs a given set of activities is a GIVEN. Thus the price charged by those 
covering the risk involved is also a given. Thus increasing the number of people 
who cover that risk has no effect on the total charge they make for covering the 
risk. 
But even if FR did increase the cost of funding banks, that is explained (wholly 
or partially) by the removal of a subsidy from the bank industry, namely the bank 
industry‟s right to print or create money. Removing a subsidy (unless there is a 
very good social justification for the subsidy) increases GDP. 
2.30. Fractional reserve is not fraudulent. 
I.e. Fractional reserve (that is the existing banking system) has been going for 
centuries and is not widely perceived as fraudulent. 
Claimed by White (2003). 
Answer. The first problem there is that White in the latter work doesn‟t say 
what the alleged fraud actually is. Instead, he refers readers on his first page to 
about ten books and articles which apparently set out the fraud. It is thus 
impossible to know what fraud or alleged fraud White refers to. 
Second, given the number of works he cites that apparently set out the fraud, it‟s 
unlikely those works all agree with each other. Indeed, there are several popular 
“fraud” charges made against fractional reserve which are clearly invalid. 
It‟s thus near impossible to deal with his claim that for fraud to exist, someone 
must be duped. Reason is that there are all degrees of “duping” from slight 
misrepresentation to serious and carefully thought out fraud. And the extent of 
misrepresentation doubtless varies depending on which of the fraud charges 
levelled against fractional reserve one is considering. 
However, as a second best, let us consider White‟s arguments as they relate a 
“fraud” charge against fractional reserve which does have some substance, and 
which is as follows. 
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A fractional reserve bank promises to return to depositors the exact sum 
deposited (maybe plus interest and maybe less bank charges). But of course the 
flaw or fraud there is that the money is loaned on or invested by the bank and that 
involves the risk that the loans or investments go bad. And sure as night follows 
day, once every twenty or thirty years the loans do go wrong, and one or more 
large banks can‟t repay all the money they owe depositors. And as to small banks 
in the US, they go bust at the rate of about one a week. 
So how much fraud or misrepresentation takes place there? Well commercial 
banks certainly do not advertising the fact that there is a one in twenty chance that 
depositors will lose their money! Quite the reverse: their publicity normally 
stresses the safety of the relevant bank. 
Of course the contract governing an account at a typical bank, the small print in 
particular, may say something different. But that‟s near irrelevant. The typical bank 
customer does not read the small print - and probably wouldn‟t understand it if they 
did. It is thus indisputable that banks are guilty of a certain amount of 
misrepresentation or to put it more strongly - “fraud”. 
2.31. A 25% or so capital ratio is good enough. 
I.e. a 25% or so ratio brings near total safety, which means there is nothing to be 
gained from a 100% ratio, which is what FR involves. 
Claimed by Wolf (2012). Wolf‟s exact words were “I accept that leverage of 33 
to one, as now officially proposed is frighteningly high. But I cannot see why the 
right answer should be no leverage at all. An intermediary that can never fail is 
surely also far too safe.” 
Answer. First, under FR, “intermediaries” can fail in the sense that shareholder / 
stakeholders can lose a sizeable proportion of their stakes. Indeed, in theory they 
can lose everything. Plus they can fail in the sense that a poorly performing 
intermediary can be taken over with the existing management sacked, as is normal 
for non-bank corporations which perform poorly. 
Second, as explained in section 29 above, the whole “high cost” idea is very 
debatable. 
Third, the Vickers commission (of which Martin Wolf was a member) claimed 
such costs were involved (see Vickers, 2011). They claimed that total safety would 
supress bank lending, which in turn would supress economic growth. However, any 
such “suppression” can be countered by standard stimulatory measures (or the 
specific stimulatory measures advocated by those who argue for FR). 
Fourth, if the capital ratio is raised to just 25% (or any other non-100% level) 
banks will simply bribe and cajole politicians over the years into reducing the ratio 
back down to the 3% or so that has obtained over the last decade or so.  In contrast, 
100% is a clear line in the sand. 
Indeed, George Osborne, Britain‟s finance minister at the time of writing, has 
campaigned against any improvement whatever in the capital ratio. The fact that his 
political party, the Conservatives, is partially funded by banks is of course entirely 
coincidental (See Wolf, 2013). 
And on the subject of “bribes and cajoling” it should be born in mind that the 
British finance industry spends £93m a year on lobbying, according to Mathaison, 
Newman, & McClenaghan (2012), while in  Europe as a whole, there are 1,700 
lobbyists working for banks (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014). 
Fifth, assuming the idea set out at the start above, namely that it‟s money 
creation by PBs that is one of the main flaws in the existing system (because that 
money printing amounts to a subsidy of PBs), then the capital ratio needs to be 
100%. That is, if PBs can to any extent accept deposits, lend on those deposits then 
money multiplication takes place. 
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As Cochrane (2013) argued, the best and cleanest system is to simply remove 
all runnable liabilities from the liability side of bank‟s balance sheets, i.e. 
implement the 100% ratio. 
2.32. A Glass-Steagall or Vickers type split is better than an FR type 
split. 
I.e. splitting the banking industry into a retail half and investment half is better 
than the FR type split: splitting the industry into safe accounts and investment 
accounts. 
Claimed for example by Vickers (2011) and Pettifor (2014). See Pettifor‟s 
paragraph starting “Next, bank‟s retail arms…” 
Answer. Vickers sets out three basic reasons for separating investment from 
retail banks on p.9 & 10. Their first reason starts “structural separation should 
make it easier and less costly to resolve banks that get into trouble”. Plus Vickers 
claims that “Investment banks can fail. Retail ones can‟t be allowed to.” Now that 
rather conflicts with Vickers‟s claim that some investment banks (as is the case 
with retail banks) cannot be allowed to fail (3.28). 
Indeed, the above first reason goes on to say that each case or “failing bank” 
should be treated differently or treated on its merits. But that makes a mockery of 
the investment / retail split. You might as well categorise banks according to which 
letter of the alphabet their names start with and then “treat each case on its merits”. 
Their second reason is that the crisis stemmed largely from the investment 
banking sector and that “Separation would guard against the risk that these 
activities (i.e. problems in the investment banking sector) might de-stabilise the 
supply of vital retail banking services.”  
Well first, Northern Rock was a retail bank, and it got into trouble. And second 
and as regards those “vital retail banking services”, Vickers admits (to repeat) that 
some investment banks are also “vital”. So Vickers‟s distinction between retail and 
investment banks is largely spurious. 
Third, Vickers claims “The proposed form of separation also gives scope for 
UK retail banking to have safer capital standards than internationally agreed 
minima..” 
Note Vickers does not claim that their proposals render retail banks 100% safe: 
in other words such banks would still have to have taxpayer funded backing, i.e. 
such banks would still need to be subsidised (which of course conflicts with 
Vickers‟s claim that taxpayers should not subsidise banks). In contrast, under FR, 
bank accounts which depositors want to be totally safe really are totally safe, thus 
no taxpayer funded backing or subsidy of those accounts is needed. 
Incidentally, the claim in the paragraph just above that taxpayer funded backing 
equals a subsidy is not necessarily valid: that is, it is clearly possible to charge 
banks for such backing. However, the idea that politicians (in receipt of “donations 
to election expenses” from bankers) will ever actually make that charge realistic is 
itself plain unrealistic. 
In short, Vickers‟s proposals are a mixture of happy talk and self-contradiction, 
all couched of course, in impeccable English. 
In contrast, under FR, the entities that arise to replace the existing banking 
industry cannot suddenly fail. Thus there is no need for bank subsidies. In short, 
FR achieves the objectives that Vickers sets itself, whereas Vickers fails to achieve 
its own objectives. 
2.33. Bank shareholders will demand a high return to reflect their 
uncertainty about what a bank actually does. 
I.e. bank management knows more about its bank that shareholders or potential 
shareholders, thus the latter will want insurance against possibly being 
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misinformed by bank management, thus equity is an inherently expensive way of 
funding banks.  
Claimed by Elliot (2013). 
Answer. Depositors and bond-holders who fund existing banks suffer from 
exactly the same asymmetric information problem. Of course depositors are 
protected from the latter problem by deposit insurance and the too big to fail 
subsidy, but the latter two are entirely artificial and unjustified subsidies. (That‟s 
where deposit insurance is funded wholly or partially by taxpayers rather than by 
banks themselves). 
2.34. Irresponsible lending under FR would be as harmful as under the 
existing system. 
Answer. There is a big difference between a bank becoming insolvent, and its 
shares declining in value. As the former governor of the Bank of England (King, 
2010) put it: 
“And we saw in 1987 and again in the early 2000s, that a sharp fall in equity 
values did not cause the same damage as did the banking crisis. Equity markets 
provide a natural safety valve, and when they suffer sharp falls, economic policy 
can respond. But when the banking system failed in September 2008, not even 
massive injections of both liquidity and capital by the state could prevent a 
devastating collapse of confidence and output around the world.” 
Thus the “harm” done by irresponsible lending under FR is significantly less 
than under the existing system. 
2.35. FR reduces commercial bank flexibility. 
I.e. under the existing system, an individual bank can lend without being too 
concerned about whether it has enough deposits to fund those loans, plus the 
commercial bank system as a whole can expand the total amount it lends without 
reference to government or CB. And as to those amounts loaned out, they of course 
just become deposits somewhere in the commercial bank system. That is, loans 
precede deposits. 
Answer. As to the above first scenario (an individual bank), that will result in 
the bank losing reserves to other banks, i.e. becoming indebted to other banks. And 
there is nothing wrong with that if the indebted bank has found particulary 
worthwhile or viable borrowers. 
But under FR, almost exactly the same happens. That is, any bank can expand 
the amount it lends if it can attract funds from somewhere: other banks, 
shareholders, etc. In other words in both cases, the bank which is expanding faster 
than others becomes indebted to other entities: the only difference is that under FR 
the latter bank has to line up its creditors before it increases its loans, whereas 
under the existing system those creditors come into existence after the new loans 
are made. 
Aggregate lending. 
As to the second scenario (the bank system as a whole) it is hard to see any 
good reason for any significant gyrations in the total amount that commercial 
banks lend. In fact it is precisely such gyrations which are half the problem. To 
illustrate, in the three years prior to the crunch, commercial bank created money / 
loans in the UK were expanding much faster than normal and much faster than the 
stock of CB created money (base money). And that resulted in a boom followed by 
a bust. 
Then, as always happens in busts, commercial banks did exactly what we do not 
want them to do, i.e. put the whole process into reverse: they called in loans, etc. In 
short, the commercial bank system exacerbates the boom bust cycle. 
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To summarise, when there is a faster than usual expansion in the amount of 
commercial bank lending, that‟s probably a sign of a boom or bubble. In contrast, 
if the money supply is under the control of the CB, it can expand the money supply 
in a way desiged to be in the best interests of the country as a whole: i.e. in 
accordance with what inflation and unemployment are doing. 
Moreover, opponents of FR (i.e. defenders of the existing banking system) are 
perfectly happy for CBs and governments to try and control the boom / bust cycle 
via interest rate adjustments, quantitative easing and so on, and the latter 
necessarily involves influencing the amount of commercial bank lending. Those 
opponents of FR thus need to explain why they object so much to commercial bank 
lending being controlled in a slightly different way, as occurs under FR. 
Profitable loans. 
An apparent excuse for the flexibility that the existing bank system affords is 
that it enables banks to make particularly viable or profitable loans quickly. The 
answer to that is that under FR, as indeed under the existing system, banks would 
give priority to the most viable loans. Thus any lack of flexibility stemming from 
FR would not stop viable loans: i.e. it‟s the least viable loans that would not take 
place. 
2.36. FR would not stop bank runs. 
I.e. given suspicions about a bank / lending entity, it‟s shares would be dumped 
in the same way as depositors withdraw money en masse from a traditional bank 
about which there are suspicions. 
Answer. Runs on stock exchange quoted shares just do not happen. Reason is 
that given bad news about a firm or corporation, the value of its shares drop before 
anyone has time to sell (with the possible exception of some inside traders). When 
the oil multinational BP caused a very large oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico a few 
years ago, it‟s shares were immediately marked down: there was no “run” on its 
shares. 
In contrast, given bad news about a conventional bank, the bank tries to pretend 
that its liabilities are still worth 100 cents in the dollar until it finally has to admit 
they are not, at which point it closes its doors. That is, the banks creditors have a 
motive to get their money out before the doors close.  
As Cochrane (2013) put it, “the financial system needs to be reformed so that it 
is not prone to runs.” 
2.37. Vickers demolished the arguments for FR. 
Answer. The Vickers commission was the main official response to the 2007/8 
bank crisis in the UK. One of the flaws in the arguments put by Vickers (2011) 
were set out in No.2 above. That‟s the argument that FR involves putting large 
amounts of money in to safe accounts or entities where such money is not loaned 
on. And that that, on the face of it, is a waste of resources. 
Another point made by Vickers, also dealt with above, is the claim that since 
FR curtails borrowing and lending somewhat, the latter activities would move to 
the less regulated sector. That point was addressed in No.21 above. 
Further flaws in Vickers‟s arguments are as follows. 
In section 3.22, Vickers makes a whole string of errors, so let us run through it 
sentence by sentence. (Vickers‟s actual words are in italics below). 
“Limited purpose banking21 offers an alternative solution, under which 
the role of financial intermediaries is to bring together savers and borrowers 
but risk is eliminated from the intermediary because it does not hold the loan 
on its books. All of the risk of the loan is passed onto the investors in the 
intermediary (or fund), so that effectively all debt is securitised. However, 
limited purpose banking would severely constrain two key functions of the 
financial system. First, it would constrain banks‟ ability to produce liquidity 
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through the creation of liabilities (deposits) with shorter maturities than their 
assets.” 
Now what‟s the word “constrain” doing there? FR does not “constrain banks‟ 
ability to produce liquidity”. It totally destroys banks‟ ability to create money / 
liquidity: the job of creating money / liquidity is handed over to the CB. 
(Incidentally, “limited purpose banking” is just an alternative name for FR.) 
As to “securitisation”, FR does not necessarily involve securitising the loans 
that banks or lending entities make (though banks would be free to securitise loans 
if they chose to). 
Moreover, there is an absolutely fundamental point here not addressed by 
Vickers, namely: is the move towards a regime where borrowing is more difficult a 
move towards a genuine free market, or a move away from free markets? The 
reason that is an important question is that it is widely accepted in economics that 
GDP is maximised where prices are at free market prices, unless there is a clear 
social justification for a subsidy or a tax (e.g. children‟s education and alcoholic 
drinks respectively). 
Now there is a simple reason for thinking that moving away from the existing 
bank system and towards FR is a move towards a free market. It is that the existing 
bank system is subsidised: indeed it is so inherently fragile that it has to be backed 
by taxpayers. Plus the right to create or print money is a subsidy of PBs for reasons 
set out in the quote from Huber in section 39 below. 
Next, the “21” near the start of the above quote is a reference to Kotlikoff‟s 
version of FR, and Kotlikoff (like other advocates of FR) does not advocate simply 
turning the existing banking industry into lending entities funded just by 
shareholders, as Vickers suggests. FR (to repeat) involves splitting the industry into 
two halves, one of which consists of lending entities funded just by shareholders, 
while the other offers totally safe transaction accounts.  
Vickers‟s next sentence reads: The existence of such deposits allows households 
and firms to settle payments easily.” 
Now amazing as it might seem, FR does not involve the destruction of all bank 
accounts which “allow households and firms to settle payments easily”. All FR 
does is (to repeat) is to have the CB rather than commercial banks create the units / 
money making up those accounts. Plus under FR, accounts which are used to 
“settle payments easily” are separated from accounts where relevant sums are 
loaned on or invested. Next, Vickers claims: 
“Second, banks would no longer be incentivised to monitor their borrowers, 
and it would be more difficult to modify loan agreements. These activities 
help to maximise the economic value of bank loans.” 
Answer. Where loans really are securitised, then obviously “modifying loan 
agreements” is difficult. But (to repeat) securitisation is not an essential ingredient 
of FR. (To be accurate, securitisation is inherent to FR in the sense that the risk 
involved in loans is carried by those who buy stakes in lending entities. But 
presumably Vickers means securitisation in the sense of offloading the risk to some 
third party which has not an inherent part of a particular lending entity.) At any 
rate, on that interpretation of what Vickers means by securitisation, there is no 
obvious reason why the amount of securitisation under FR would be much different 
as compared to the existing system.And as to the fact that banks are not 
“incentivised to monitor their borrowers” where loans are securitised, that is no 
more a problem under FR than under the existing system. 
2.38. Regulating loans is better than FR. 
I.e. an obvious way to make banks safer is to impose more stringent regulations 
on lenders for example insisting on minimum equity stakes for mortgagors (i.e. 
insisting on maximum loan to value ratios for mortgagors). 
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Answer. The first problem there is that that is relatively easy to do in the case of 
mortgages, but not in the case of loans to businesses. For example some bank 
managers, quite rightly, lend to particular businesses because they know the 
relevant business proprietors and know the latter to be competent and trust-worthy. 
Setting up rules and regulations to cater for those elusive characteristics of business 
proprietors is impossible. 
Second, even if it were possible to forbid the making of risky loans, it is hard to 
see the case for doing so where lender and borrower now what they are doing, and 
assuming there are no harmful systemic consequences when a significant 
proportion of those loans go wrong. And the latter is exactly what FR achieves 
because when a significant number of loans go wrong, lending entities do not 
become insolvent: all that happens is that shares in lending entities decline in value. 
It is precisely risky loans that sometimes turn out to be the most profitable and 
productive. 
Moreover, under FR, those who fund loans are free to have their money loaned 
on in whatever way they want: if they really want to fund NINJA mortgages, they 
are free to do so. 
2.39. Private banks do not earn seignorage profits. 
Answer. The word seignorage is not defined in exactly the same way in every 
dictionary. The word is used here to refer to profit made by an entity that prints or 
issues money: the simplest and crudest example being a backstreet counterfeiter 
who prints inherently worthless bits of paper, and uses them to buy goods of real 
value. 
Governments, assisted by their central banks do much the same. That is, they 
simply print money and spend it. Governments get something of real value (e.g. a 
road, school or war ship) and simply pay with bits of paper, or to be more realistic, 
with book-keeping entries. 
Certainly where recipients of that money are prepared to hold the money 
without demanding interest (as is the case with £10 notes, $100 bills, etc), 
government enjoys seignorage. As to where government has to pay interest to 
recipients of that money, then essentially government funds its spending by 
borrowing, and there is no real seignorage there. 
Of course few people are bothered by the seignorage enjoyed by governments 
because government property is property that everyone benefits from. 
In the case of PBs, it is much less clear whether and if so how they enjoy 
seignorage. However, Huber & Robertson (2000) explain pretty clearly how they 
do it in this simple illustration: 
“Allowing banks to create new money out of nothing enables them to 
cream off a special profit. They lend the money to their customers at the full 
rate of interest, without having to pay any interest on it themselves. So their 
profit on this part of their business is not, say, 9% credit-interest less 4% 
debit-interest = 5% normal profit; it is 9% credit-interest less 0% debit-
interest = 9% profit = 5% normal profit plus 4% additional special profit. 
This additional special profit is hidden from bank customers and the public, 
partly because most people do not know how the system works, and partly 
because bank balance sheets do not show that some of their loan funding 
comes from money the banks have created for the purpose and some from 
already existing money which they have had to borrow at interest.” 
Of course PBs do not lend to one lot of borrowers at the free market rate and to 
another lot at the artificially low rate that comes from lending out freshly printed 
money, as is rather suggested in Huber & Robertson‟s simple illustration. Rather, 
PBs use the freedom to print money to lend at a lower rate than would otherwise 
obtain, and that expands the total amount of business that PBs do. The profit 
derived from that extra lending is certainly seignorage of a sort. 
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Fontana & Sawyer (2016, p.3) claim that PBs do not enjoy seignorage. Fontana 
& Sawyer do not produce any arguments worth talking of to back that claim, but 
they do cite the first half of a chapter from Graziani (2003, p.58-66). So let us run 
through that passage of Graziani‟s. 
The first problem with Graziani‟s argument is that he defines money, or at least 
his ideal form of money as something that does not involve seignorage! 
Well I can prove that boats don‟t float using my own special definition of the 
word boat which is something like “anything that sinks”! 
The relevant words of Graziani‟s are (his p.60), “A real money should satisfy 
three main characteristics … iii) the use of money must be so regulated as to give 
no privilege of seigniorage to any agent.” 
Graziani‟s basic argument is that the simple / basic / obvious activity of banks 
involves no seignorage, which is correct. That basic activity is that a bank creates 
and lends money to person X as needed so that X can pay Y for goods or services 
supplied. Y then deposits the money at Y‟s bank, which in turn demands payment 
(in the form of base money) from X‟s bank. Clearly there is no seignorage profit 
there for either bank. 
However (and to repeat), the freedom that PBs have to print a proportion of the 
money that they lend out is a clear boost or subsidy for the PB industry. I.e. that 
amounts to seignorage. 
2.40. Full reserve nullifies automatic stabilisers. 
Fontana & Sawyer (2016) claim, “Finally, FRB will nullify the automatic 
stabilisers…”. 
Answer. Fontana & Sawyer are right to say that under the existing system, when 
unemployment rises, government does not need to plead for funds to pay for the 
increased unemployment benefit burden: government just borrows more. 
However, it really doesn‟t take a genius to set up a rule under which 
government under a FR automatically gets funds from the central bank to pay for a 
rise in the unemployment benefit bill (or at least a proportion of it). But there‟s 
another problem with Fontana & Sawyer‟s above alleged problem with automatic 
stabilisers, as follows. 
As explained above, even under the existing system, assuming an independent 
central bank, the central bank has the final say on the amount of stimulus. Now 
suppose there‟s a rise in the unemployment benefit bill: that probably means 
demand is too low which means the central bank will not raise interest rates, and 
indeed may cut them. 
On the other hand, it‟s always possible that despite a rise in unemployment, the 
central bank still thinks demand is too high (i.e. inflation is too high). In that case 
the central bank is likely to counteract a rise in demand stemming from the 
automatic stabilisers kicking in. So even under the existing system, central banks 
can scupper the automatic stabilisers. And a central bank may in fact be right to do 
that: for example a rise in unemployment in one month is not a brilliant reason for 
thinking a recession is on the way. In fact Sumner (2013) takes that point further 
and claims that all forms of fiscal stimulus (including automatic stabilisers) are 
near pointless because central banks are dominant. 
So…. the automatic stabilisers only work under the existing system gratis the 
central bank! And that set up really isn't much different to what would obtain under 
FR where (as Fontana& Sawyer suggest) FR scuppers the automatic stabilisers. But 
if you don‟t like that, i.e. if you‟re an “automatic stabiliser” enthusiast, then it‟s not 
difficult (to repeat) to incorporate an automatic stabiliser element in FR. 
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